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PARTNERSHIP-NOTICE OF AUTHORITY OF PARTNER TO
PERSON DEALING WITH FIRM: PARTNER'S AUTHORITY
UNDER THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT-IS
IGNORANCE BLISS?
First National Bank and Trust Co. v. Scherr,
467 N.W.2d 427 (N.D. 1991).
On September 15, 1981, Pius and Albinus Scherr opened a
checking account at the First National Bank and Trust Company
of Williston (the Bank) in the name of their newly formed con-
struction and building investment partnership, Scherr and
Scherr.1 That same day, the Scherrs both signed a partnership
checking account signature card that allowed either partner to act
individually when borrowing money for the partnership.2 Later, a
partnership agreement was drafted which prohibited a single part-
ner from borrowing money on behalf of the partnership without
the other partner's written consent. 3 A copy of the signed part-
nership agreement was delivered to the Bank at its request.4 Over
the next few years, the partnership borrowed money from the
Bank on several occasions for use in buying and constructing
1. First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Scherr, 467 N.W.2d 427, 427 (N.D. 1991) (Scherr
III). This case is the third in a series of three involving the Scherrs. For the history of these
cases, see infra note 7.
2. Id. The Partnership checking account signature card gave the Bank permission:
to accept (whether or not payable to the partner who signs the same or to any
other partner) checks, endorsements, notes, . . . mortgages or any other
instruments for the deposit or withdrawal of funds, for borrowing money and
pledging or mortgaging assets of the partnership as security for the payment
thereof and for the transaction of any other business with it, when signed by any
- of the undersigned.
Id. A box on the signature card next to the partners' signatures which read "Number of
Signatures Required" was filled in with the number "1." Id. at 428. The signature card was
filed in the Bank's checking account files but was not put in the Bank's loan files. Id.
3. Id. Pius and Albinus signed the partnership agreement on October 1, 1981 and on
December 21, 1981, respectively. Id. The agreement provided as follows:
Neither partner shall, without the written consent of the other partner, endorse
any note, or act as an accommodation party, or otherwise become surety for any
person. Without the written consent of the other partner, neither partner shall
on behalf of the partnership borrow or lend money, or make, deliver or accept
any commercial paper, or execute any mortgage, security agreement, bond or
lease, or purchase or contract to purchase, or sell or contract to sell any property
for or of the partnership. Neither partner shall, except with the written consent
of the other partner, assign, mortgage, grant a security interest [sic] in, or sell his
share in the Partnership or in its capital assets or property, or enter into any
agreement as a result of which any person shall become interested with him in
the Partnership, or do any act detrimental to the best interests of the
Partnership or which would make it impossible to carry on the ordinary business
of the Partnership.
Id. (quoting the partnership agreement).
4. Scherr 111, 467 N.W.2d at 428. The Bank filed the agreement with the partnership
loan papers. Id.
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properties.5 On October 27, 1983, Pius Scherr, by himself and
without written approval from his partner, Albinus Scherr, took
out a short-term partnership note for $65,000, which he signed
individually.6 After the Scherrs defaulted on their debts, the Bank
sued the Scherrs and the partnership to recover on the $65,000
note.7 The trial court held that Albinus and the partnership were
not liable for the $65,000 note, because the Bank "had written
knowledge" of the restriction in the partnership agreement that
prohibited a single partner from borrowing money on the partner-
ship's behalf.' On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court held
that although the Bank had a previously signed signature card
authorizing a single partner to bind the partnership to a loan, the
fact that the Bank had subsequent knowledge of a restriction in
the partnership agreement it had received and retained in its files
precluded a finding of liability against Albinus and the partnership
5. Id. There were a series of loans which were made to the Scherrs from 1981 to 1985.
See Brief of Appellant at 3-5, First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Scherr, 467 N.W.2d 427 (N.D.
1991) (No. 90091) (available at the Thormodsgard Law Library) [hereinafter Brief of
Appellant]. One of the partnership's construction projects involved the building of a
Famous Recipe Chicken Restaurant. Scherr 11, 467 N.W.2d at 428. This venture was
financed through a $100,000 mortgage that was given to the Bank and signed by both Pius
and Albinus in April 1983. Id. Subsequently, Pius alone signed four separate notes for a
total of an additional $100,000. Id. On October 26, 1983, these four individual notes were
combined into a single long-term mortgage that was signed by both Pius and Albinus. Id.
6. Id. The following language was typed on the loan papers: "THE PURPOSE OF
THIS LOAN IS: Final construction on the Famous Recipe Chicken." Id. (quoting the loan
papers). The Bank renewed the note several times until May of 1985, with only Pius signing
for the partnership. Id.
7. Id. The Bank also foreclosed on the long-term mortgage. Id. Initially, the trial
court granted the Bank's motion for summary judgment against the partnership, Pius, and
Albinus for the unpaid portion of the $65,000 note, plus interest. Id. All three appealed.
Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court upheld the Bank's summary judgment award against
Pius; however, the court reversed and remanded the summary judgment decisions that
were rendered against Albinus and the partnership. First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v.
Scherr, 435 N.W.2d 704, 707 (N.D. 1989) (Scherr 1). On remand, the trial court was to
determine the consequences, if any, the restriction in the partnership agreement would
have on the issue of liability of Albinus and the partnership. See id.
Later, in a related matter, Pius sought further review of the summary judgment
entered against him on grounds of recently discovered evidence. First Nat'l Bank and
Trust Co. v. Scherr, 456 N.W.2d 531,532 (N.D. 1990) (Scherr I1). Pius argued that evidence
revealed that the $65,000 note was secured and that anti-deficiency judgment statutes did
not allow a judgment against him. Id. at 532-33. The North Dakota Supreme Court
reversed the summary judgment against Pius and remanded. Id. at 534. Pius then filed for
bankruptcy, and the issue of Pius' liability to the Bank was decided in that court. First Nat'l
Bank and Trust Co. v. Scherr, 467 N.W.2d 427, 429 n.1 (N.D. 1991) (Scherr III).
8. Scherr 11, 467 N.W.2d at 429. The trial court found an additional factor supporting
its decision; namely, that the Bank "'thereafter established a course of conduct of business
with the partnership consistent with those restrictions."' Id. (quoting the trial court
decision). While the trial court felt it was not clear whether the checking account signature
card could bind the partnership to a note signed by only one partner, it stated that " 'in any
event, the restrictive language.., in the Partnership Agreement ... overrides and controls
the signature card in the event of a conflict.'" Id. (quoting the trial court decision). The
court dismissed the Bank's action against the partnership and Albinus, and the Bank
appealed the decision to the North Dakota Supreme Court. Id.
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on the $65,000 note.9
During the 1800s, increased use of partnerships in the United
States led to the growth of the common law of partnership. 10
Early court decisions recognized that a third person having notice
of a restriction on a partner's authority was bound by the restric-
tion." One court characterized this rule as "an old principle of
the common law."'1 2 Thus, a third party who deals with a partner
who is acting outside his authority may recover from only the act-
ing partner and not the dissenting partner or the partnership. 13
9. See id. at 430.
10. JUDSON A. CRANE AND ALAN R. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON
PARTNERSHIP, § 2, at 12 (1968).
11. See, e.g., Irwin v. Williar, 110 U.S. 499, 505 (1884); Monroe v. Conner, 15 Me. 178,
182 (1838); Lord Gallway v. Matthew, 103 Eng. Rep. 775, 776 (1808). Courts and legal
writers in many instances have used the terms "notice" and "knowledge" in unintended
ways. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 3, 6 U.L.A. 14-15, official cmt. (1914). Specifically, the
word "notice" has been used when "knowledge," as defined below, was intended. Id. The
term "notice," as defined in the Uniform Partnership Act, refers to actions that allow the
person who acted "to assert that notice has been had and claim the benefit thereof,
irrespective of whether the person charged has had knowledge or not." Id. at 15. The
Uniform Partnership Act attempts to distinguish the terms "knowledge" and "notice" as
follows:
(1) A person has "knowledge" of a fact within the meaning of this act not only
when he has actual knowledge thereof, but also when he has knowledge of
such other facts as in the circumstances shows bad faith.
(2) A person has "notice" of a fact within the meaning of this act when the
person who claims the benefit of the notice:
(a) States the fact to such person, or
(b) Delivers through the mail, or by other means of communication, a
written statement of the fact to such person or to a proper person at his
place of business or residence.
Id. at 14. Another writer has also tried to avoid confusion -by defining notice, notification
and knowledge as follows:
Notice of a fact is the legal consequence of the receipt of a notification, or of the
acquisition of knowledge with reference to a fact.
.... A notification is an act intended to give information to another, which
for most purposes has the same legal effect as if the other had received the infor-
mation.
.... Knowledge, on the other hand, is subjective, although the evidence to
prove it is objective.
WARREN A. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 9, at 17-18 (1964). See also
Red River Commodities, Inc. v. Eidsness, 459 N.W.2d 805, 809 (N.D. 1990) (holding under
commercial law that actual knowledge of a fact may supersede the requirement of notice in
a contract).
12. See Urquhart v. Powell, 54 Ga. 29, 32 (1875) (citation omitted).
13. See Leavitt v. Peck, 3 Conn. 124, 128 (1819). Authority has been defined as "the
power of the agent to affect the legal relations of the principal by acts done in accordance
with the principal's manifestations of consent to him." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 7 (1958). Under partnership law, partners are considered agents of the
partnership. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9, 6 U.L.A. 132 (1914); Egner v. States Realty Co.,
26 N.W.2d 464, 468 (Minn. 1947); Engstrom v. Larson, 44 N.W.2d 97, 109 (N.D. 1950).
Furthermore, the Uniform Partnership Act states explicitly that "[tihe law of agency shall
apply under this act." UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 4(3), 6 U.L.A. 16 (1969). Thus, the
liability of a partner for the obligations incurred by his partners without his consent is "a
question of agency" law. Irwin, 110 U.S. at 505. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 24 cmt. a (1958) (the agent "may have power to affect the interests of the
principal .... ). Evidence of authority may come in three types: (1) the partnership
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The nonliability of the partnership and the other partners flows
from "principles of justice and equity" which apply to all con-
tracts, including partnership agreements.' 4 Furthermore, it has
been said that this rule results entirely from the third party being
on notice that the partnership and other partners will not be
bound. 15
With the development of the common law came problems,
however, including deficiencies of authority in important areas of
the law and conflicts in legal theory between jurisdictions. 6 In
1902, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws took action to establish a uniform law on partnership entitled
agreement, (2) the partnerships course of business, (3) the course of business of comparable
partnerships in the area. CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 10, § 49, at 276.
"The Uniform Partnership Act gives rise to a presumption of a partner's authority and
agency" to carry on business on behalf of the other partners and the partnership. See 59A
AM. Jun. 2D Partnership § 249 (1987). The Act provides that "the act of every partner...
for apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the partnership of which he is a
member binds the partnership .. " UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9(1), 6 U.L.A. 132 (1914).
Thus, if the act is within the partnership's "usual" way of doing business, the partnership
and the other partners will be liable. Id. Problems have arisen in trying to interpret
whether "usual way" means for the specific partnership or for other comparable
partnerships. CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 10, § 49, at 277. The correct position is
probably to use both tests in the determination. See id.; Burns v. Gonzales, 439 S.W.2d 128,
131 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969). The partners are held jointly liable for the debts of the
partnership. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 15, 6 U.L.A. 174 (1914).
14. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP, § 129, at 217
(7th ed. 1881).
15. See Leavitt, 3 Conn. at 128. Common law opinions discussing the issue of
notification to persons dealing with the firm regarding a partner's authority are exemplified
by Baxter v. Rollins, 57 N.W. 838 (Iowa 1894). In Baxter, a bank sued the individual
partners of an egg preserving partnership to collect on a past due promissory note that the
partnership's business manager had signed. Baxter, 57 N.W. at 839. The partners argued
that the bank knew the partnership agreement did not in any manner authorize the
business manager to borrow money for the partnership. Id. Construing the partnership
agreement, the Supreme Court of Iowa reasoned that because the agreement lacked any
reference to additional funding, it was apparent that no extra funds were to be acquired by
the partnership. Id. at 840. Thus, the manager had no authorization to sign for the
partnership on the note in question. Id.
The court noted the general rule by saying third persons "knowing the stipulations of
the contract, are bound by it." Id. In this case, however, the partners had later agreed to
reduce the initial investment amount, and the manager represented to the bank that the
loan was needed to cover the shortfall. Id. While the bank had no knowledge of the
change, the court stated that they did not need to be fully informed to be responsible to
make further inquiries. Id. at 841. The court concluded, as a matter of law, that the bank
had notice of the partnership agreement, was put on inquiry, and consequently could not
recover against the partnership. Id.
16. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr, 6 U.L.A. 7 (1914). As the number of partnerships
increased, the need for uniformity of partnership law also grew. Id. This was especially the
case where firms began operating in several states and had members of the partnership
living in different states. Id.
The lack of legal authority was evident in areas such as daily operations and in the
winding up of the partnership. Id. Many states did not have any authority on these
significant matters. Id. Clearly, statutes that would guide people in making these decisions
would be of great value. Id.
Other problems surfaced in the area of partner-creditor rights. Id. Here, the problem
was "an almost hopeless confusion of theory and practice," which made legal decision
difficult and, at times, unfair. Id.
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the Uniform Partnership Act."7 In October 1914, the Conference
voted to approve the Act and to support its adoption by all of the
state legislatures.' 8 Pennsylvania was the first state to adopt the
Uniform Partnership Act, doing so in 1915.11 North Dakota
adopted the Uniform Partnership Act in 1959 as North Dakota
Century Code sections 45-05-01 to 45-09-15 and 45-12-04 (1978).20
The Uniform Partnership Act incorporates the common law of
agency and partnership.21 Section nine of the Act provides as
follows:
1) Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the
purpose of its business, and the act of every partner,
including the execution in the partnership name of any
instrument, for apparently carrying on in the usual way
the business of the partnership of which he is a member
binds the partnership, unless the partner so acting has in
fact no authority to act for the partnership in the particu-
lar matter, and the person with whom he is dealing has
knowledge of the fact that he has no such authority.
4) No act of a partner in contravention of a restriction
on his authority shall bind the partnership to persons hav-
ing knowledge of the restriction.22
17. Id. at 5. The Committee on Commercial Law was given the job of hiring an expert
to begin work on a proposal. Id. At first, the Committee employed Dean James Barr Ames
of Harvard Law School to begin work on the draft. Id. Upon Dean Ames's death, Dr.
William Draper Lewis, Dean of the Pennsylvania School of Law, and Mr. James B.
Lichtenberger began to rework the initial draft and notes of Dean Ames. Id. at 5-6. The
subsequent drafters changed the basis of the draft from the entity theory to one based on
the aggregate or common law theory of partnership. Id. at 6 (citation omitted).
The entity, or mercantile, theory considers the partnership to be a legal person,
"owning the property and incurring obligations." Judson A. Crane, Uniform Partnership
Act A Criticism, 28 HARV. L. REV. 762, 763 (1915). See CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note
10, § 3, at 16-25. Under the common law or aggregate theory, the partners are the only
legal persons, and they own the property and incur the partnership obligations. Crane,
supra, at 763. See also A. Ladru Jensen, Is a Partnership Under the Uniform Partnership
Act an Aggregate or an Entity?, 16 VAND. L. REV. 377, 377-79 (1963) (concluding that both
theories are used in the Uniform Partnership Act). North Dakota is evidently an aggregate
state. See 501 DeMers, Inc. v. Fink, 148 N.W.2d 820, 824 (N.D. 1967) (holding that a
partnership is not a legal entity aside from the partners).
18. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 7 (1914).
19. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 1 (1969 & Supp. 1991); HAROLD G.
REUSCHLEIN AND WILLIAM A. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AND
PARTNERSHIP, § 174 (1979).
20. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 1 ( Supp. 1991).
21. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 4, 6 U.L.A. 16 (1914); Ellis v. Mihelis, 384 P.2d 7, 13
(Cal. 1963); Bank of Bellbuckle v. Mason, 202 S.W. 931, 933 (Tenn. 1918). In Mason, the
Supreme Court of Tennessee held that notification from one partner to a bank that he
would not cover the overdrafts of his partner was sufficient to relieve the notifying partner
of liability. Mason, 202 S.W. at 933.
22. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9(1)-(4), 6 U.L.A. 132-33 (1914). The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is currently drafting a proposed
1992] 243
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A recent case properly applying section nine of the Uniform
Partnership Act is Evans v. Pioneer Bank.2 3 In Evans, Pioneer
Bank brought an action to collect a partnership debt against part-
ner Jim Evans, personally.24 Evans argued that, because only one
of the managing partners had signed the note, the partnership
could not be liable.25 Evans attempted to buttress his argument
with the partnership agreement, which stated that no partner
could borrow money without the consent of all the managing part-
ners. 6 Pioneer Bank argued, however, that not all of the signa-
tures were needed to hold the partnership liable.
The Supreme Court of Wyoming first considered Wyoming's
version of section nine of the Uniform Partnership Act.2' The
revision to the Uniform Partnership Act. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT, (Proposed Draft
6/7/91); Should the Uniform Partnership Act Be Revised?, 43 Bus. LAw. 121, 121 (1987).
Under the proposed revision, § 9 of the Uniform Partnership act may be modified to
explicitly state that the "usual way" test will include both the partnership in question and
other similar partnerships. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AT § 103, at 22-23 (Proposed Draft
6/7/91). For an explanation of the "usual way" test, see supra, note 13. In addition, the
proposed revision may also make changes to § 3 (Interpretation of Knowledge and Notice)
of the Uniform Partnership Act. Id. at 7. Generally, the proposed revision of § 3 would be
substantially based on the Uniform Commercial Code. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT, § 103
cmt. (Proposed Draft 6/17/91); U.C.C. § 1-201(25)-§ 1-201(27) (1991). The proposed
revision does vary from the U.C.C. by providing "that a person knows or has knowledge of a
fact when that person is aware of it." UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT, § 103 cmt. (Proposed Draft
6/17/91). The U.C.C. provides that "[a] person 'knows' or has 'knowledge' of a fact when
he has actual knowledge of it." U.C.C. 1-201(25) (1991). The drafting committee hopes to
have a final draft ready in the summer of 1992. Telephone Interview with Debra
Perelman, Legislative Counsel, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws Uan. 20, 1992).
23. 809 P.2d 251 (Wyo. 1991).
24. Evans v. Pioneer Bank, 809 P.2d 251, 252 (Wyo. 1991). Mr. Evans, along with five
additional people, was a member of a partnership named Environmental Safeguards. Id.
According to the partnership agreement, Ronald J. Bolin and Dee A. Bolin were the
managing partners of Environmental Safeguards. Id.
In May of 1984, Mr. Bolin individually signed a $35,000 promissory note for the
partnership. Id. The business name "Environmental Safeguards" was inserted above Mr.
Bolin's signature on the note. Id.
25. Id. at 253.
26. Id. Paragraph 7 of the Environmental Safeguards partnership agreement
provided as follows:
Except with the consent of all the managing partners, no partner shall on behalf
of the partnership borrow or lend money, or make deliver, or accept any
extraordinary commercial paper, or execute any mortgage, security agreement,
bond, or lease, or purchase or contract to purchase, or sell or contract to sell any
property for or of the partnership, other than the type of property bought and
sold in the regular course of its business.
Id. at 254 (quoting the partnership agreement).
27. Id. at 253. As a basis for its argument, Pioneer Bank sought to focus the trial court's
attention on the following language in the partnership agreement: "'Any managing
partner shall have the right to draw checks upon any bank account of the partnership, and
to make, deliver, and accept commercial paper in connection with the business of the
partnership.'" Id. (quoting the partnership agreement).
28. Id. at 252. The Wyoming Statute provides as follows:
(a) Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business,
and the act of every partner, including the execution in the partnership name of
any instrument, for apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the
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court found that" '[t]he Uniform Partnership Act states that no act
of a partner in contravention of a restriction on authority will bind
the partnership to persons having knowledge of the restric-
tion.' "29 Next, the court concluded that the partnership agree-
ment's general business language was subordinate to the precise
reference in the partnership agreement limiting the borrowing
and lending authority of the partners.3 °
Another argument by Pioneer Bank, that Evans had the bur-
den of proving that the other managing partner did not give his
assent to the signing of the note, was also found to be without
merit.3 1 The trial court had found that " '[a] 11 the managing part-
ners consented to the loan.' "32 The Supreme Court of Wyoming
reversed, holding that Pioneer Bank knew about the restriction in
the partnership agreement and was therefore bound by it.
33
In First National Bank and Trust Co. v. Scherr,34 the North
Dakota Supreme Court examined North Dakota's version of sec-
tion nine of the Uniform Partnership Act in determining what
effect notice of a borrowing restriction in a partnership agreement
had on a bank that was dealing with an individual partner.35 In
Scherr, the Bank contended that the lending authority granted to
it by the partnership checking account signature card was a bind-
ing contractual agreement between the parties to the loan, and
therefore the signature card should control over the partnership
agreement.36 The Bank argued further that while it knew about
partnership of which he is a member binds the partnership, unless the partner so
acting has in fact no authority to act for the partnership in the particular matter,
and the person with whom he is dealing has knowledge of the fact that he has no
such authority.
(d) No act of a partner in contravention of a restriction on his authority shall bind
the partnership to persons having knowledge of the restriction.
WYo. STAT. § 17-13-301 (1989). Wyoming's statute is identical to the North Dakota statute
concerning a partner's authority to act for the partnership. Compare id. with N.D. CENT.
CODE § 45-06-01 (1978). For text of § 45-06-01, see infra note 39.
29. Evans, 809 P.2d at 253 (quoting 59A AM. JuR. 2D Partnership § 267 (1987)).
30. Id. at 253-54. For the general language argued by Pioneer Bank, see supra note 27.
For the specific reference used by Evans in his argument, see supra note 26.
31. Id. at 254.
32. Id. (quoting the trial court's decision).
33. Id. at 254-55. The court found that the trial court's ruling that Dee Bolin had
consented to the note was very questionable. Id. at 254. Moreover, the court did not feel
that the appellee had met its burden of proof. ld. at 255.
34. 467 N.W.2d 427 (N.D. 1991) (Scherr III).
35. First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Scherr, 467 N.W.2d 427, 430 (N.D. 1991) (Scherr
III).
36. Id. at 429. The Bank reasoned that because Albinus had signed the signature card,
he had consented to Pius' individually signing the $65,000 note. Id. Consequently, any
variation of the terms between the signature card and partnership agreement should be
found irrelevant. Id.
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the restriction in the partnership agreement,3 7 the explicit author-
ization given to it by the signature card was not modified by a sub-
sequent restriction in the partnership agreement made
unilaterally by the partners a.3  The court did not discuss the Bank's
argument based on contract law, however, but decided the case
pursuant to Agency-Partnership law.3 9 Analyzing section 45-06-01
of the North Dakota Century Code (North Dakota's version of sec-
tion nine of the Uniform Partnership Act) and case law from other
jurisdictions, the court stated that "knowledge of a restriction on,
or revocation of, an individual partner's authority controls over a
preexisting arrangement with a creditor.
4 0
37. Id. Indeed, the Bank's former President, Duane Sorensen, testified that he was
aware of the restriction in the partnership agreement at the time he dealt with Pius in
making the loan. Brief of Appellant, supra note 5, at 8. Mr. Sorensen felt that an
agreement between the Scherrs could not override the authority given to the Bank through
the signature card. Id.
38. Scherr 111, 467 N.W.2d at 429. The Bank believed that the signature card was a
binding contract between it and the Scherrs. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 5, at 8
(arguing that the signature card fulfilled all of the requirements of a contract under the
North Dakota Century Code). The Bank went on to argue that a contract could not be
modified or changed without its consent. Id. at 9. The court did not find these arguments
persuasive. Scherr III, 467 N.W. 2d at 429.
39. See Scherr III, 467 N.W.2d at 429. First, the court noted that it had previously
stated that statutes control "the authority of a partner to act for the partnership." Id. (citing
First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Scherr, 435 N.W. 2d 704, 707 (N.D. 1989) (Scherr I) (citing
N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-06-01 (1978))). Next, the court recognized that North Dakota had
adopted the Uniform Partnership Act. Id. The court then quoted from § 45-06-01 of the
North Dakota Century Code, North Dakota's version of § 9 of the Uniform Partnership Act,
which provides as follows:
1. Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business,
and the act of every partner, including the execution in the partnership name of
any instrument, for apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the
partnership of which he is a member binds the partnership, unless the partner so
acting has in fact no authority to act for the partnership in the particular matter,
and the person with whom he is dealing has knowledge of the fact he has no such
authority.
4. No act of a partner in contravention of a restriction on authority shall bind
the partnership to persons having knowledge of the restriction.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-06-01 (1978). The court concluded from the above quoted statute
that the law of agency governs a partner's liability to third parties. Scherr III, 467 N.W. 2d
at 429. The court also cited to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY for authority to
support its conclusion. Id. The Restatement provides that "the rights and liabilities of part-
ners with respect to each other and to third persons are largely determined by agency
principles." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14A cmt. a (1958).
40. Scherr III, 467 N.W. 2d at 429-30. The court recognized that the duplication in
parts one and four of § 45-06-01 of the North Dakota Century Code highlighted the fact
that the law required such a decision. Id. at 429.
To further support its position, the court stated that many other courts have held that a
third party is later unable to recover from the other partners or the partnership for dealings
with the partner to the transaction when the third person was on notice of a restriction on
the acting partner's authority. Id. (citing Van Dusen v. The Star Quartz Mining Co., 36 Cal.
571 (1869); Baxter v. Rollins, 57 N.W. 838 (Iowa 1894); Dawson Blakemore & Co. v. Elrod,
49 S.W. 465 (Ky. 1899); Bank of Bellbuckle v. Mason, 202 S.W. 931 (Tenn. 1918); Dayle L.
Smith Oil Co. v. Continental Supply Co., 268 S.W. 489 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924); Gladson v.
Heagle, 212 N.W. 175 (Minn. 1927); T.T. Word Supply Co. v. Burke, 57 S.W.2d 610 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1933); De Santis v. Miller Petroleum, 85 P.2d 489 (Cal. App. 2d 1938); West Side
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Finding that the partnership agreement controlled, the court
then focused its attention on deciding "whether delivery of the
written partnership agreement to the Bank was effective notice
that Pius' individual authorization had been restricted."'4 1  The
court reiterated the trial court's finding that, as a matter of fact,
the Bank had received notification of the restrictions in the part-
nership agreement.42 Next, the court looked to the North Dakota
Century Code for guidance in answering the notice question.43
The court recognized that not only had the Bank known of the
restriction in the partnership agreement, but it also had requested
and been given a copy of the agreement.44 As a result, the court
ruled that the Bank had knowledge of the restriction on the part-
ner's authority, was bound by that knowledge, and could not
Trust Co. v. Gascoigne, 121 A.2d 441 (N.J. Super. 1956); Arrington v. Columbia Nitrogen
Corp., 309 S.E.2d 428 (Ga. App. 1983). See also 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partnership § 267 (1987);
68 C.J.S. Partnership § 143 (1950). Compare Owens v. Palos Verdes Monaco, 191 Cal. Rptr.
381, 386-90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)).
41. Scherr 11, 467 N.W. 2d at 430. Initially, the court noted that the burden of proof
fell upon the party asserting that the agent acted within his authority-in this case, the
Bank. Id.
42. Id. See also Red River Commodities, Inc. v. Eidsness, 459 N.W.2d 805, 810 (N.D.
1990) (agency is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court).
43. Scherr 111, 467 N.W.2d at 430. Section 45-05-02 provides as follows:
A person has "knowledge" of a fact within the meaning of this title not only
when he has actual knowledge thereof, but also when he has knowledge of such
other facts as in the circumstances shows bad faith.
A person has "notice" of a fact within the meaning of this title when the
person who claims the benefit of the notice:
1. States the fact to such person; or
2. Delivers through the mail, or by other means of communication, a written
statement of the fact to such person or to a proper person at his place of business
or residence.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-05-02 (1978).
The court also found the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY helpful in solving the
notice issue. See Scherr III, 467 N.W.2d at 430. Section 167 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY provides as follows:
If a person dealing with an agent has notice that the agent's authority is created
or described in a writing which is intended for his inspection, he is affected by
limitations upon the authority contained in the writing, unless misled by the con-
duct of the principal.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 167 (1958). The court stated that no issue of fraud
was asserted at trial or on appeal. Scherr 111, 467 N.W. 2d at 430.
In addition, the court found that the Bank had not raised the question of a ratification
of the $65,000 note by the partnership. Id. In Askew v. Joachim Memorial Home, 234
N.W.2d 226, 237-38 (N.D. 1975), the Supreme Court of North Dakota discussed the con-
cept of ratification. See id. The court defined ratification as follows: "The affirmance by a
person of a prior act which did not bind him but which was done or professedly done on his
account, whereby the act, as to some or all persons, is given effect as if originally authorized
by him." Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 82 (1958)). Ratification of an
act can be done expressly or through conduct. Askew, 234 N.W.2d at 237. Furthermore,
while normally a principal must know all the material facts before ratification will be found,
if the principal deliberately makes himself or herself accountable without finding out all of
the facts, the principal will be liable for the unauthorized acts of the agent. id. at 238.
44. Scherr III, 467 N.W.2d at 430.
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recover against Albinus and the partnership.4 5
The decision of the North Dakota Supreme Court in Scherr
may have some impact on the way business operates in North
Dakota. Not only lenders, but also manufacturers, wholesalers,
retailers and other entities doing business with a partnership could
find themselves in the same position as the Bank in Scherr. For
example, if a business is on notice not to supply goods to partner A
without partner B's consent, but does so anyway, the business may
find itself without a remedy against either the partnership or part-
ner B.46
At first glance, the logical thing for a business to do in
response to Scherr is to request a copy of the partnership agree-
ment and to thereafter conduct business in strict compliance with
the terms of authority expressed in the agreement. However, this
inquiry would greatly increase the risk to the business that its part-
nership accounts could eventually become uncollectible debts,
even if extremely reliable measures of recording and utilizing the
45. Id. The court presented the issue in Scherr as "whether delivery of the written
partnership agreement to the Bank was effective notice that Pius' individual authorization
had been restricted." Id. The statute in question clearly indicates that it is "knowledge" of
the fact or restriction, not "notice," that is required. See N.D. CENT CODE § 45-06-01
(1978). By referring to notice several times, it seems that the court may have been trying to
use "notice" to satisfy the "knowledge" requirement. Scherr III, at 467 N.W.2d at 430.
However, the court does state twice that the Bank "knew" about the restrictive partnership
agreement. Id. at 429-30. Moreover, the court concludes by finding that the trial court was
not clearly erroneous in holding "that the Bank was bound by its knowledge .... " Id. at
430. Factual determinations are overturned only when they are found to be clearly
erroneous. Id. (citing N.D. R. Civ. P. 52 (a)). Therefore, the court acted reasonably in
finding that the Bank had actual knowledge of the fact there was a restriction in the
partnership agreement. See id.; N.D. CENT. CODE. § 45-05-02 (1978).
46. See DeSantis v. Miller Petroleum Co., 85 P.2d 489, 491 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1938);
Dawson Blakemore & Co. v. Elrod, 49 S.W. 465, 465 (Ky. 1899); Arrington v. Columbia
Nitrogen Corp., 309 S.E.2d 428,430 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983); T.T. Word Supply Co. v. Burke, 57
S.W.2d 610,613 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933). In Burke, the plaintiff corporation brought an action
against the partnership to recover for oil field equipment it had supplied to the partnership.
Id. at 610-11. Burke, a member of a two person partnership, was the only partner to answer
the complaint. Id. at 610. Burke had given notification to the plaintiff that he would not be
liable for any bills incurred by his partner without his prior approval. Id. The plaintiff sent
a letter to Burke confirming his request. Id. at -12.
The partnership agreement made reference to the fact that the expenses were to be
paid out of the sale of the oil leases. Id. at 611. The court did not discuss whether the
partnership agreement contained any restriction on the other partner's authority. Id.
Instead, the court stated that the dissenting partner's notification to the plaintiff indicated
that the "implied agency" had terminated. Id. (citation omitted). The court gave
considerable weight to the fact that the plaintiff had received and "acknowledged" the
notification. See id. at 613. The court then held that after a partner has given notification,
he " 'is not liable for the price of goods sold to his co-partner over his protest' .... Id.
(quoting Dawson Blakemore & Co. v. Elrod, 49 S.W. 465 (Ky. 1899)). But cf National
Biscuit Co. v. Stroud, 106 S.E.2d 692, 695 (N.C. 1959). The defendant partner in Stroud
gave notification to a supplier that he would not be held liable for continued shipments to
his co-partner. Id. at 694. The partnership had only two members. Id. The court held the
protesting partner was liable because he was not a majority, and therefore he could not
restrict the authority of his partner, who was just continuing to buy goods in the ordinary
course of the partnership business. Id. at 695.
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information are in place. This risk can be appreciated when one
considers that it was the Bank's affirmative action in Scherr in gain-
ing knowledge of a restriction in the partnership agreement that
led to its inability to collect on the $65,000 note.
While businesses will want to be aware of the holding in
Scherr, they should not be overly concerned. As North Dakota
Century Code section 45-06-01 indicates, a business that does not
have knowledge of a restriction on a partner's authority and is
dealing with the partnership through one of its partners in the
context of the partnership's usual way of doing business, should be
able to recover from the partnership.47 Scherr suggests that the
best solution for businesses that deal with partnerships in the ordi-
nary course of the partnership's business may be to cautiously
carry on business as usual, without inquiring into the partner's lim-
itations of authority.
Steven j Sarbacker
47. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 45-06-01 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 14A
cmt. a (1958).
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